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ABSTRACT 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority, charged with the maintenance of standards 
consistent with the privacy of the individual, began with no guidance from the 
legislature as to what privacy should encompass. Now it has developed a workable 
definition and accumulated a wealth of knowledge in the area of privacy. 
This paper examines how effective the Authority is in determining privacy complaints 
and concludes that although the Authority is highly accessible to complainants, the 
accessibility of broadcasters is hampered by a lack of guidance as to the meaning of 
privacy. 
The Authority has developed seven privacy principles which form a good basis for 
determining complaints, however they are quite vague and introduce terms without 
definition. The Authority has also, to a degree, confused the concept of privacy with 
fairness and defamation, which complicates the issue. Further the Authority's 
decisions do not always clearly spell out the reasoning behind the decision, which 
lowers their value as precedent. 
To further promote the maintenance of 'standards consistent with the privacy of the 
individual' this paper advocates that the Broadcasting Standards Authority should 
work towards a code of broadcasting practice for privacy, giving greater guidance and 
responsibility to the broadcasters. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and annexures) 
comprises approximately 13,826 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right in a democratic society, thus 
broadcasters have a fundamental role to play in informjng, educating and entertaining 
the public. However in a society that cries out for information the intrusion of privacy 
is rated the most unacceptable breach of broadcasting standards. 1 Thus not only are 
broadcasters responsible for ensuring freedom of expression but they are responsible 
for the maintenance of standards that are consistent with the privacy of the individual. 
In New Zealand the privacy of the individual is currently protected principally by the 
Privacy Act 1993, the developing tort of invasion of privacy and, in the particular case 
of the broadcast media, by the privacy principles developed by the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority. This paper examjnes the efficacy of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority's approach to the issue of privacy. 
The Broadcasting Act 1989 established the Broadcasting Standards Authority to 
provide for the maintenance of programme standards in broadcasting in New 
Zealand. 2 This paper addresses in particular the standards in relation to the privacy of 
the individual. Part II introduces the structures and functions of the Authority. The 
Broadcasting Act did not define privacy so the Broadcasting Standards Authority was 
left to develop its own concept of privacy. Part II also looks at this development and 
introduces the Authority's privacy principles. 
To be an efficient standards regime a body must be accessible to all parties concerned. 
In the case of broadcasting standards the Authority needs to be accessible to 
complainants, so that they can uphold the standards by initiating complaints, and 
accessible to the broadcasters so that they can uphold the standards through their 
conduct and by preventative measures such as training. 
Part III considers the efficacy of the Broadcasting Standards Authority from the 
perspective of a complainant's access to the Authority. In this regard the public's 
1 G Dickinson, M Hill & W Zwaga Mo11itori11g Community Attitudes in Changing Mediascapes (The 
Dunmore Printing Company Limited, Palmerston North, 2000) [Cha11ging Mediascapes]. 
2 Broadcasting Act 1989, Long Title. 
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awareness of the Broadcasting Standards Authority, the adequacy of remedies for 
complainants, the structure and formalities of the complaints procedure, fairness of 
the procedure for complainants and the ability to appeal are considered. This part 
considers the role of compensation in a standards regime and concludes that it is 
necessary only to the extent that it recognises the personal harm involved. Privacy is 
to a large extent irremediable; therefore regulation is necessary as a preventative 
measure. The goal of statutory regulation is to promote high standards, not to provide 
personal remedies to complainants. The tort of invasion of privacy is now reasonably 
well established and is a more appropriate forum to deal with civil actions. It is also 
submitted that the courts are a better forum for dealing with the issuance of 
injunctions. The power of prior restraint can almost be equated with censorship. 
Given the serious nature of this remedy it is contended that the courts are better 
equipped with a well-established body of law to deal with injunctions. 
The effect on broadcasters of the high level of accessibility for complainants is also 
considered. Here the issues of unaffected complainants, vexatious complaints and 
double jeopardy arise. It is proposed that complaints of invasion of privacy from 
unaffected complainants are entirely consistent with the nature of a standards regime. 
Vexatious complaints are uncommon in the area of privacy however it is contended 
that as the issue could arise in the future an efficient method of dealing with such 
complaints should be developed. With regard to the threat of double punishment in 
the courts under the tort of privacy this paper suggests that complainants should not 
be required to waive the right to receive damages in the courts. Although there is a 
danger to broadcasters in some respects of the court proceedings being jeopardised by 
a prior Broadcasting Standards Authority decision, a complainant should not be 
forced to give up their right to damages if they choose to also maintain the standards 
for the benefit of all society. 
The foundation of a strong regulatory system is guidance. Clear and concise, easy-to-
follow guidelines enable broadcasters to be proactive and to a large extent avoid 
invading the privacy of individuals. It is difficult to comply with standards if their 
scope and meaning is unclear, especially in the time-constrained environment of the 
broadcasting industry. 
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As well as having to comply with the legislative requirements of the 
Broadcasting Act, broadcasters also have to fulfil their shareholders' need for a 
return on their investment, the audience's expectation about programming 
content and their employees' requirement for a safe and stimulating work 
environment ... All of these challenges occur within a context in which 
commercial imperatives may or may not dovetail with quality imperatives and 
where deadlines, cost control and other operating constraints are a minute by 
minute reality. 3 
Part IV examines the Broadcasting Standards Authority's approach to privacy and its 
jurisprudence. Privacy is a difficult concept to define. Ruth Gavison believes privacy 
has three components: secrecy, or the limitation of information known about an 
individual; anonymity, or the limitation of attention paid to an individual; and 
solitude, or the limitation of physical access to an individual.4 These overlapping 
concepts are recognised in the Broadcasting Standards Authority's privacy principles 
by way of a protection against the disclosure of private, and some public, facts and a 
protection against intentional interference with an individual's interest in solitude and 
seclusion.5 
This paper considers the privacy principles that the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
has developed to deal with complaints alleging invasion of privacy and concludes that 
the principles are not as effective as they could be in providing guidance for 
broadcasters. The Broadcasting Standards Authority has endeavoured to establish 
sound principles and to consistently and articulately apply them,6 however the privacy 
principles are based on the American tort of invasion of privacy and have not been 
adapted to any large extent for New Zealand purposes. The effect of this is that the 
wording of the principles is not as clear and easily applicable as it could be, nor are 
they specifically directed at the broadcasting industry. Also the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority puts a high emphasis on the facts in each case and does not 
3 Joan Withers "Broadcasters Know Their Responsibilities" (Broadcasting Standards Authority 
Quarterly Jan 2000) l. 
4 Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421,428. 
5 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion (BSA, Wellington, 25 June 1992) see privacy 
principles (i), (ii) and (iii). For a full list of the principles see Appendix I. 
Sam Mating "Some Reflections on Vacating the Chair" (Broadcasting Standards Authority Quarterly 
July 2000) 1. 
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always clearly explain how it has reached its conclusions. This lowers the precedent 
value of the decisions and can limit the decisions to very particular factual situations. 
The role of the defences of public interest and consent are considered as well as the 
issue of the invasion of privacy of public figures. The defence of public interest is 
essential in the process of balancing the right to privacy and the right to publicity 
whilst the defence of consent, although a bit of a misnomer, is a practical necessity. It 
is argued that public figures should not be denied a right to privacy solely on the 
ground of their high public profile. The public's right to know should only prevail 
where the information is connected to their public role. 
Part V considers the borders of privacy and looks at the extent to which privacy has 
been confused with fairness and reputation. It appears that the concept of privacy has 
been confused to some degree with fairness particularly in the fourth and fifth 
principles. The Authority also seems to have extended its jurisdiction to defamation 
by considering the disclosure of facts to be an invasion of privacy regardless of the 
veracity of the facts. This is a concerning development. 
This paper concludes that the Broadcasting Standards Authority's privacy principles 
can only be fully understood in the context of the Authority's decisions. This is not 
particularly helpful for broadcasters who have to make split second decisions 
regarding the content of their broadcasts. It is proposed that the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority ought to take advantage of their new ability to create a code of 
broadcasting practice for privacy in the light of their jurisprudence over the past 
decade. 7 Such a code should be sufficiently detailed so that a broadcaster can gain a 
full understanding of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's concept of privacy 
without reading a single decision of the Authority. 
7 The Broadcasting Amendment Act 2000 enables the Broadcasting Standards Authority to make codes 
of broadcasting practice relating to the privacy of the individual, previously the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority was restricted to Advisory Opinions in thi area. 
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II. THE BROADCASTING STANDARDS AUTHORITY 
A. The Broadcasting Act 1989 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority is an independent statutory body established by 
the Broadcasting Act 1989 primarily to receive and determine complaints made about 
broadcasts. 8 The Broadcasting Standards Authority has the jurisdiction to determine 
complaints that, amongst other matters, a broadcaster has not maintained in its 
programmes and their presentation, standards which are consistent with the privacy of 
the individual.9 
The four members of the Broadcasting Standards Authority are appointed by the 
Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Minister of Broadcasting. 10 Thus 
although the Authority is an independent body there is clearly a potential for political 
influence. Former chairperson of the Authority, Sam Maling, has suggested that this 
political influence is wrong when much of the Authority's work involves sensitive 
political issues and not infrequently complaints by politicians.11 
The true extent of such an influence is difficult to quantify. It is likely to manifest in 
the Authority ' s general approach rather than in specific decisions or standards. 
Although there is potential for abuse, a degree of political influence may in fact be 
desirable. As the democratically elected representatives of the people it is appropriate 
that the government should exert some influence in terms of representing society's 
current attitudes towards broadcasting and standards in general. 
The Broadcasting Act also contains safeguards regarding membership. The 
chairperson must be a barrister or solicitor of not less than seven years practice.12 One 
of the members is appointed after consultation with representatives of the 
broadcasting industry 13 and another is appointed after consultation with 
8 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 10. 
9 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 4(l )(c). 
10 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 26. 
11 Mating, above n 6, 4. 
12 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 26(2). 
13 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 26(1A). 
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representatives of public interest groups in relation to broadcasting. 14 This ensures 
that the Authority has legal experience and aims to ensure that both the interests of the 
broadcasting industry and the public are represented. At present two members have 
experience in journalism and one has extensive experience in radio broadcasting. 
Some television broadcasters have questioned whether the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority has sufficient knowledge of the television industry especially in the current 
deregulated environment. 15 This criticism fails to acknowledge the broadcasters' 
ability to express their point of view in their submissions on complaints, and their 
ability to consult with the Authority. Broadcasters need to be prepared to work with 
the Authority rather than viewing them as "just policemen." 16 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority is funded partly by money appropriated by 
Parliament to the Authority 17 and partly by an annual levy on broadcasters, which 
consists of .00051 % of their operating revenue over $500,000. 18 In effect the 
broadcasters are paying to be complained about, however this is probably in their best 
interests as the Broadcasting Standards Authority is a far cheaper forum for dispute 
resolution than the court system. 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority only considers a matter if a member of the 
public complains about it. Thus their role does not encompass any degree of 
censorship or proactive monitoring of the media. Where the Minister of Broadcasting 
considers it is desirable in the public interest he or she can request the Authority to 
consider whether it is appropriate to issue an Advisory Opinion on the matter. 19 This 
course of action has, to date, not been undertaken. In a recent survey the Authority 
found that 24% of New Zealanders believed that the Authority did serve this function. 
This suggests that the public need more education about the role of the Authority. 20 
14 Broadcasting Act 1989 s 26(1B). 
15 Steve Braunias "See Evil, Hear Evil - inside the Broadcasting Standards Authority's Culture of 
Complaint" (New Zealand Listener May 6-12, 2000) 28, per Mark Jennings, director of news and 
current affairs at TV3 . 
16 Braunias, above n 15, 27, per Derek Lowe, chairman of Radio works (Radio Pacific and The Rock). 
17 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 31. 
18 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 30A, B and C. According to the Broadcasting Standards Authority Annual 
Report for the year ended 30 June 1999 the Authority received $488,889 from Parliament and $366,329 
from Broadcaster levies. 
19 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 23. 
2° Changing Mediascapes , above n 1. 
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Concern was also raised in Parliament when the Broadcasting Bill was introduced that 
the Authority did not have the power to initiate complaints when it believed standards 
were not being met. 21 It would be inconsistent with the Authority's principle of 
maintaining standards, for the Authority to have such an ability. The better view is 
that where a body is adjudicating complaints it is inappropriate for that same body to 
initiate complaints as this would destroy the impartiality of the decision-makers. A 
degree of separation of powers is necessary. 
B. The Broadcasting Standards Authority's Approach to Privacy 
The Broadcasting Act 1989 does not define privacy. The Broadcasting Standards 
Authority has therefore developed its own jurisprudence largely adopting the 
approach of the United States as the High Court did in Tucker v News Media 
Ownership Ltd22. The first complaint received by the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority in 1990, Fay McAllister v Television New Zealand Limited,23 was not 
upheld, however it provided an opportunity for the Authority to define privacy. The 
case involved a Television New Zealand broadcast of the funeral of a skinhead who 
had committed suicide after murdering a City Council worker. 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority believed that because its decisions can be 
appealed to the High Court,24 it was unable to rely solely upon everyday notions of 
privacy to determine complaints made under s4(1)(c) of the Broadcasting Act. Thus 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority endeavoured to take an approach based on legal 
principles.25 
Due to the Jack of a clear legal concept of privacy in New Zealand the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority began with the idea that "an individual's privacy cannot be 
protected by Jaw to such an extent as to override the legitimate interests of other 
21 (13 December 1988) 495 NZPD 8826-8839. 
22 Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd [1986] 2 NZLR 716, [Tucker]. 
23 Fay McAllister v Television New Zealand Limited (1990-005), [McAllister]. 
24 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 18(1). 
25 McAllister, above n 23, 7. 
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members of society."26 In order for both the individual's right to privacy and the 
public's 'right to know' to coexist neither could be given its fullest meaning: 27 
if individual privacy is given its largest interpretation, the valued freedom of the 
media would be severely constrained; if the 'public interest' in events is given its 
widest interpretation - to cover the public's curiosity about all matters reported 
to it - there would be no room left for individual privacy to be respected. 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority referred to Tucker v News Media Ownership 
Ltd28 where McGechan J invoked American notions of privacy in support of the High 
Court's earlier decision. The Broadcasting Standards Authority considered the four 
American torts of privacy as discussed in Prosser and Keeton29 and adopted the 
formulation of two of the torts: that the public disclosure of private facts or public 
facts would invade the privacy of the individual where. the facts disclosed were highly 
offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities and that 
the intentional interference with another's interest in solitude or seclusion was an 
invasion of privacy. Further given McGechan J's comments in Tucker regarding 
public facts, the Broadcasting Standards Authority felt that s4(1)(c) may provide 
greater protection against the disclosure of public facts than is provided in the United 
States.30 
Despite being assisted in its comprehension of privacy by such materials as official 
reports on privacy, legal text books, and by commentaries on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Authority opted for a wholesale 
importation of the unusual American phraseology. This appears to have been merely 
for convenience as the most developed ideas came from the United States. Also the 
adoption of the American concept of privacy was not without legal precedent, as 
McGechan J had invoked American notions of privacy in Tucker. 
26 McAllister, above n 23, 8. 
27 McAllister, above n 23, 8. 
28 Tucker, above n 22. 
29 P Keeton & W L Prosser Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5 ed, West Publishing Co, Minnesota, 1984) 
856-859. 
30 McAllister, above n 23, 8. 
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Further the Broadcasting Standards Authority recognised that the New Zealand 
concept of privacy might differ from the American tort, specifically referring to the 
concept of the 'reluctant debutante' in Tucker. 31 McGechan J considered that public 
figures may have a lesser right to privacy, however reluctant debutantes, those who do 
not voluntarily enter the public arena but are thrust into the public limelight by their 
circumstances, may retain their right to privacy. However there was no attempt on the 
part of the Broadcasting Standards Authority to elaborate or elucidate the principles, 
or any discussion as to relevant local considerations in the New Zealand broadcast 
industry. The consequences of this will be discussed later. 
The Authority also considered an Australian Law Reform Commission Report32 in 
regard to three proposed defences: public interest, consent and that the information 
complained of is a matter of public record. The Authority concluded that the defences 
of public interest and consent would also have to be examined in relation to any 
complaint. The Authority acknowledged that the New Zealand courts may not endorse 
the American notions of privacy and therefore stated that they would have come to the 
same conclusion had the Australian Law Reform Commission's views been applied. 
In declining to uphold Fay McAllister's complaint the Authority held that as the 
cemetery was a public place and the footage had been filmed from a public street the 
case involved the public disclosure of public facts. 33 However the disclosure was not 
sufficiently offensive or objectionable to breach the test, and there was sufficient 
public interest in the original attack and the 'Nazi' behaviour at the funeral to justify 
the broadcast. The consent received for the filming from other members of the family 
further justified the broadcast.34 
Over the next two years the Broadcasting Standards Authority considered nme 
privacy complaints during which it developed its approach to privacy. In 1992 a 
particularly complicated factual scenano arose providing the impetus to the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority to issue an Advisory Opinion outlining the privacy 
3 1 Tucker, above n 22, 735 . 
32 Australian Law Reform Commission Privacy - No. 22 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1983). 
33 McAllister, above n 23 , 12. 
34 McAllister, above n 23, 12. 
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principles it had developed. The Broadcasting Standards Authority has used advisory 
opinions35 in the area of privacy, as section 2l(l)(e) did not apply to privacy. This 
was amended in July 2000 and now allows for the development of a code of 
broadcasting practice for privacy. 36 
C. The Privacy Principles 
The Advisory Opinion highlighted five relevant pnvacy principles, which the 
Authority intended to apply when considering complaints alleging a breach of 
privacy. The first two established protection against the disclosure of highly offensive 
and objectionable private facts and highly offensive and objectionable public facts 
which have become private through the passage of time. The third principle provided 
protection against offensive interference with an individual's interest in solitude and 
seclusion. And the last two principles established the defences of public interest and 
consent. In 1995 TV3 challenged these principles in the High Court. 37 The High Court 
approved the approach taken by the Broadcasting Standards Authority, Chief Justice 
Eichelbaum stated: 38 
I see no error of principle in the authority's decision to regard prying as one 
potential form of breach of privacy, nor in its adoption of the approach gleaned 
from USA case law as a foundation for its own guidelines on the topic. 
Since then a further two principles (principles (iv) and (v)) were added in 1996 to deal 
with factual situations the Broadcasting Standards Authority believed were not 
covered by the earlier principles. Principle (iv) protects against the disclosure of 
private facts to abuse, denigrate or ridicule a person and principle (v) protects against 
the disclosure of a person's name, address or telephone number without consent. In 
1999 it became apparent that the responsibility of broadcasters in regard to the privacy 
of children needed to be clarified. This was done by altering the defence of consent so 
that it only justifies broadcasts that are in the best interests of the child. 
35 Broadcasting Act 1989, s2l(l)(d). 
36 Broadcasting Amendment Act 2000, s 4. 
37 TV3 Network Services Limited v Broadcasting Standards Authority (1995] 2 NZLR 720, [TV3 v 
BSA]. 
38 TV3 v BSA, above n 37, 729. 
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Thus the Broadcasting Standards Authority has now developed seven pnvacy 
principles39 which it applies when determining a complaint that a broadcaster may 
have contravened section 4(1)(c) of the Broadcasting Act. The Authority states that 
"[t]hese principles are not necessarily the only privacy principles that the Authority 
will apply; [t]he principles may well require elaboration and refinement when applied 
to a complaint; [and t]he specific facts of each complaint are especially important 
when privacy is an issue."40 
The Authority does refer to its previous decisions where they are considered relevant, 
but preserves for itself considerable flexibility in dealing with complaints.41 Defining 
privacy is no easy task so the Authority's desire to maintain flexibility is 
understandable however from a broadcaster's perspective this flexibility can be 
equated with uncertainty. This uncertainty undermines the benefit of the regulatory 
system, as it is difficult to maintain standards consistent with the privacy of 
individuals if broadcasters do not know what privacy is until the Authority determines 
a complaint. 
D. Privacy Complaints 
The number of privacy complaints received by the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
has steadily increased over the past eleven years, and although the total number of 
complaints has also been rising the proportion of privacy complaints as a percentage 
of the total has increased from about 2% to 18%.42 This does not appear to be 
indicative of less stringent standards on the part of broadcasters as the trends 
regarding the number of decisions upheld have remained relatively constant.43 
Therefore the increase could be the result of greater awareness of the Broadcasting 
39 See Appendix I for a full list of the Privacy Principles. 
40 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion (Broadcasting Standards Authority, Wellington, 
25 June 1992). 
41 John Burrows & Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 
1999) 186, [Media Law]. 
42 This statistic ignores the first year of complaints in which 16% were privacy complaints as this was 
skewed by the fact that only 12 complaints were received in that year. 
43 The Authority upholds about a third of privacy complaints with the exception of the year ended 30 
June 2000 in which the Authority upheld half of the privacy complaints received. 
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Standards Authority or of privacy issues in general. The Hon Maurice Williamson, 
former Minister of Broadcasting, believes that it is "an indication that the system is 
working. Members of the public are increasingly exercising their right to complain, 
and by doing so they hold broadcasters accountable in standards matters."44 
A privacy complaint may be made directly to the Broadcasting Standards Authority, 
unlike other complaints which must go first to the broadcaster concerned. The 
reasoning behind this is unclear. Originally the lack of a clear definition of privacy 
and of what is in the public interest, the emotive aspect of privacy and the desire to 
resolve disputes speedily may have been the reasons that privacy complaints were fast 
tracked to the Authority. However the Broadcasting Tribunal, the predecessor to the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority, considered that allowing a direct reference to the 
Authority for breaches of privacy was not necessary or desirable. 45 There seems to be 
no reason why broadcasters should not be the first port of call, especially now that the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority has developed an approach to the definition of 
· 46 pnvacy. 
If a complaint is made directly to the Broadcasting Standards Authority the Authority 
can only assess the privacy aspect of the complaint, as all other complaints must go to 
the broadcaster first. The Broadcasting Standards Authority advises complainants to 
refer their complaint to the broadcaster concerned if it involves standards other than 
privacy.47 However many complainants fail to do this as they feel they have already 
laid their complaint. Thus fast-tracking complaints can prejudice complainants. The 
Broadcasting Standards Authority does not have the jurisdiction to consider standards 
complaints directly48 and extending its jurisdiction to allow it to consider them where 
a complaint alleges a breach of p1ivacy could lead to complainants alleging a breach 
44 Hon. Maurice Williamson "Speech to the Broadcasting Summit Conference" (New Zealand 
Executive Government Speech Archive, 23 April 1996) 
http ://www.executi ve. govt. nz/93-96/ minister/will iamson/m ws230496. htm . 
45 Broadcasting Tribunal "Submission to the Select Committee on Planning and Development on the 
Broadcasting Bill 1988." 
46 In the year ended June 30 1999 of the 22 complaints received by the Authority seven were referrals 
from broadcasters ' decisions. Of those seven five were not upheld, one was upheld with no penalty and 
one was upheld with compensation and costs awarded . This indicates that broadcasters are capable of 
assessing privacy complaints in the first place and their decisions are generally upheld. 
47 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion 26 July 1994. 
48 McAllister, above n 23 . 
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of privacy simply to fast-track their complaints. This could all be overcome by the 
Authority adopting a procedure of submitting the standards issues to the broadcaster 
on behalf of the complainant or by requiring all complaints to go to the broadcaster 
first. 49 
III. EFFICACY OF THE BROADCASTING STANDARDS AUTHORITY 
- COMPLAINANTS' ACCESSIBILITY 
A. Accessibility 
To be effective in the maintenance of standards the Broadcasting Standards Authority 
needs to be accessible. Knowledge is an important factor in the accessibility of a 
statutory body. The public needs to be aware of the Authority's function and how to 
complain. Since 1996 broadcasters have been required to screen or air daily a notice 
publicising the procedure for complaints. 50 The Broadcasting Standards Authority has 
also established an 0800 free-telephone number explaining the complaints procedure 
and have created a school education kit for secondary and tertiary institutions.51 
A survey in 1998 found 81 % of New Zealanders were aware of the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority's existence however only 51 % identified the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority as an agency that receives complaints. 52 Nearly a quarter of those 
surveyed believed the Authority was a censoring body and 7% confused the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority with 'NZ On Air. ' 53 This suggests that although a 
clear majority is aware of the Authority more education about the role of the 
Authority is required. 
The survey also identified that women, young people and those on low incomes were 
most likely to be unaware of their ability to complain and often believed that nothing 
49 In the year ended 30 June 1999 the Authority received 22 complaints of which 7 were referrals from 
broadcasters decisions. Of those 7: 5 were not upheld, l was upheld without penalty and l was upheld 
with compensation and costs awarded. This is indicative that broadcasters get it right most of the time. 
50 Broadcasting Actl989, s6(ba) inserted by Broadcasting Amendment Act 1996. 
51 Broadcasting Standards Authority Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1999. 
52 Changing Mediascapes, above n l. 
53 NZ On Air collects the public broadcasting fee and disburses its proceeds in grants designed to 
achieve social objectives in broadcasting. 
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would be done about their complaints. Beyond further publicity it is difficult to see 
how this perceived ineffectiveness can be addressed. More publicity regarding 
decisions the Authority has upheld could assist yet these are often reported in the 
news already. Perhaps a level of perceived ineffectiveness is inherent in the provision 
of a public service and is only corrected with society's general acceptance of that 
body. 
The cost of proceedings can also be a significant hindrance to an individual's ability 
to complain. Complainants do not contribute to the cost of proceedings and legal 
representation is not required. Thus in comparison to the court system the barriers to 
justice are much lower. The time involved and delays in the proceedings can be costly 
to complainants, especially in the area of privacy where delays can increase or 
aggravate the harm. A formal complaint to the Broadcasting Standards Authority must 
be made within twenty working days54 of the broadcast.55 This time limit may appear 
to disadvantage complainants, however from a practical, evidential point of view a 
limit is required so that broadcasters do not have to retain recordings indefinitely.56 
If the complaint is made directly to the broadcaster it must be investigated and within 
twenty working days the broadcaster must advise the complainant of its decision and 
any action taken in relation to the complaint. 57 The Authority expects broadcasters to 
have systems in place to ensure that formal complaints are dealt with appropriately.58 
If the complainant is not satisfied with the broadcaster's decision, the action taken by 
the broadcaster or the broadcaster has failed to consider the complaint, the complaint 
may be referred to the Authority, but must be done so within twenty working days. 
Broadcasters can use their discretion to accept late complaints, however this is 
probably not advisable for a broadcaster, except to maintain goodwill, as in at least 
54 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 9. Section 2: "working day" excludes weekends, statutory holidays and the 
Christmas - New Year period: 25 December- 15 January. 
55 Broadcasting Standards Authority Advisory Opinion (BSA, Wellington, 1994): If the Authority 
believes a privacy complaint referred directly to them also involves standards issues they will advise 
the complainant to consider complaining to the broadcaster on these matters. 
56 Broadcasters must retain recordings for 35 days after a broadcast although in some situations a script 
will be suffice. 
57 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 8(l)(b). 
58 DD v The Radio Network (1999-062/063). Also see Broadcasting Act 1989, s 5(a). 
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two cases this action has resulted in the imposition of orders of compensation against 
the broadcaster concerned. 59 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority endeavours to consider all complaints within 
forty days of receipt and have achieved this in between 80 -90% of cases in the past 
few years.60 In comparison with the court system the cost of a complaint is much 
lower and complaints are considered far more expeditiously.61 
However there may be a potential indirect cost to complainants of not going to court. 
Although complainants do not waive their legal rights to subsequent legal action the 
existence of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's complaints procedure and the 
lack of independent legal advice may preclude a complainant realising their ability to 
proceed under the tort of privacy. 
Pursuing a tort action can be costly and uncertain, given the embryonic state 
of the civil action at present, but may result in significant damages. Where [a 
complaint to the BSA succeeds] the compensation is likely to be in hundreds 
of dollars rather than thousands. 62 
B. Adequacy of Remedies 
If the Authority upholds any complaint, in whole or in part, the Authority may order 
the broadcaster to publish an approved statement, to refrain from broadcasting or from 
broadcasting advertising for a specified period, or to pay compensation, not exceeding 
$5,000, to an individual whose privacy was breached.63 The Authority also has the 
power to order any party to pay any other party such costs and expenses as are 
reasonable. 64 
59 Complainant S v Radio Pacific (1996-003) $2,500 compensation was awarded; J & J McDonagh v 
Television New Zealand Limited (1997-007) $500 compensation was awarded. 
60 Broadcasting Standards Authority Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1999. 
61 Department of Courts Annual Report 1998: Two-thirds of defended civil proceedings and crimjnal 
trials were disposed of in the target period of 52 weeks. 
62 Media law, above n 41, 186. 
63 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 13. In comparison the British Broadcasting Standards Commission only 
has the power to direct the broadcaster to publish a summary of the complaint and the Commission 's 
findings. It has no power to make any financial awards or even to order an apology or correction. 
64 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 16(1). 
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The Authority will often refrain from imposing any order. This is often a reflection on 
the adequacy of the action taken by the broadcaster, for example where a broadcaster 
displayed a genuine concern and made sufficient and appropriate efforts to remedy the 
situation, no order was imposed. 65 Action to prevent further breaches, such as 
destroying footage, 66 and prompt action in dealing with a breach67 have also resulted 
in orders not being imposed. Other reasons given by the Authority for not imposing 
orders include that the breach was rninor,68 that the decision was not unanimous,69 and 
that the relevant code was ambiguous. 70 
Monetary orders are usually small and are often paid as costs to the Crown. However 
the maximum of $5,000 has been awarded. 71 Where the Authority imposes costs or 
advertising bans the amounts payable by the broadcaster can be much higher72 and the 
public humiliation resulting from being removed from the air should not be 
underestimated. In the parliamentary debate on the matter Mr Gerald stated: 73 
... to be taken off air for up to 24 hours if a complaint is justified .. the penalties 
are much too severe and Draconian. They are unreal. No other commercial 
business would have to close its doors if it committed an offence. 
The Broadcasting Act does not create a right to privacy it establishes a standards 
regime whereby broadcasters must uphold standards consistent with the privacy of the 
individual. In a strict standards regime compensation for breaches of the rights of 
individuals is inappropriate because the goal is the maintenance of standards for the 
benefit of society. However privacy blurs the borders of a strict standards regime 
because it is inherently personal. This is especially so where, as is the case at hand, 
65 BB v Radio Bay of Plenty (1999-107/108). 
66 Janice Dunphy v Television New Zealand Limited (1994-019). 
67 Ross Warren v The Radio Network of New Zealand Limited ( 1999-235). 
68 Murray Arnesen v Television New Zealand Limited (1997-100/101). 
69 Maternity Services Consumer Council v Television New Zealand Limited (1998-041/042). 
70 Holding v TV3 Network Services Limited (1996-181). 
71 Mrs S v TV3 Network Services Limited (1994-001). 
72 In The Diocese of Dunedin & Others v TV3 Network Services Limited (1999-125-137), the "Sex, Lies 
and Videotape" case, the broadcaster was ordered to refrain from advertising for 2½ hours and pay 
costs and expenses of $75,000 to the complainants and $15,000 to the Crown on top of the privacy 
compensation. 
73 (4 May 1989) 497 NZPD 10407 per Mr Gerald (Rangiora). However it should be noted that the 
power to remove a broadcaster from the air has never actually been used. 
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the enabling legislation singles privacy out with different procedures and 
compensation. 
Compensation is necessary only in so far as it recognises the personal harm involved. 
Criticisms of the low amounts of compensation are put into perspective when 
considered in the light of the purpose of the legislation. Complainants also now have 
the ability to take a civil action against broadcasters in the tort of privacy to recover 
damages. Thus the current level of compensation seems appropriate. 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority is unable to act on material that has not been 
broadcast, thus it is unable to prevent the broadcast of potentially privacy invading 
material. The Broadcasting Standards Authority's justification for this is:74 
Although s 6(1) is not explicitly confined to complaints about programmes 
which have been broadcast, in view of the explanation of the Act's intention 
contained in its long title and in view of s 6(3) (and other references to time 
limits), the Authority has considered its jurisdiction is limited to complaints 
about programmes which have been broadcast. In taking this approach, the 
Authority does not want to suggest that there are no controls on broadcasters on 
the manner in which material is gathered for a broadcast. Rather it is of the view 
that such matters, like all others within the Authority's jurisdiction, cannot raise 
broadcasting standards issues until the item is broadcast. 
It is contended that as the harm caused by an invasion of privacy is immediate and 
irreversible it is to a large extent irremediable except by punishing and thereby 
deterring the conduct.75 This underestimates the value of regulation but does raise the 
issue of prior restraint. Damages are a poor remedy for an invasion of privacy because 
compensation can never undo the harm caused by the broadcast. 
In England the Broadcasting Standards Commission guidelines state:76 
74 Judith MacKenzie v Television New Zealand Limited (ID1995-001). 
75 Elizabeth Paton-Simpson "Human Interests: Privacy and Free Speech in the Balance" (1995) 16 
NZULR 225,230. 
76 British Broadcasting Standards Commission Codes of Guidance - Code on Fairness and Privacy 
(http://www.bsc.org.uk) 11. 
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Privacy can be infringed during the obtaining of material, even if none of it is 
broadcast, as well as in the way in which the material is used within the 
programme. 
However prior restraint is viewed as censorship and as such it is a significant threat to 
freedom of speech. This has resulted in a higher threshold for the granting of 
injunctions in defamation cases. 
With the emergence of the tort of pnvacy it 1s unnecessary to provide the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority with the power of prior restraint. Free speech 
should not be fettered lightly, thus injunctions should be left in the domain of the 
courts. Although the courts are not as accessible, they have a well-established body of 
law in this area which should not be disturbed. 
C. Formalities 
The nature of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's proceedings is adversarial, 
parties make arguments and are able to respond to the other parties' arguments. The 
Broadcasting Standards Authority generally decides complaints without formal 
hearings as the Broadcasting Act provides that the Authority shall provide for as little 
formality and technicality as is permitted by the Act, the proper consideration of the 
complaint and the principles of natural justice.77 Thus there is rarely any face to face 
contact and no direct cross-examination. The complainant is denied their "day in 
court" however this significantly reduces the costs, as there is no need for lawyers and 
travel costs. Thus the overall procedure is much more flexible than the court structure 
and more user friendly. 
There are however rules as to procedure, such as time limits and inability to introduce 
new issues, and rules as to evidence such as the requirements for broadcasters to 
maintain copies of their broadcasts for certain time periods. 
77 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 10(2). 
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The proceedings are less public than court proceedings as the Authority rarely uses 
formal hearings. This is beneficial in privacy proceedings as further publicity 
generally exacerbates an invasion of privacy and the Authority also has the power to 
suppress complainants' names.78 It is the Authority's usual practice not to publish the 
name of a complainant when upholding a complaint which alleges a breach of privacy 
unless in the circumstances it is impractical to do so.79 
The format of the decisions is designed to be useful to the specific parties involved in 
a complaint. However it appears that this focus makes the decisions less beneficial in 
the sense of creating precedent for broadcasters to follow, especially given the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority ' s strong emphasis on the facts in each case. Often 
the plain language does not clearly address the legal questions and the Authority does 
not clearly state the reason for the decision in a specific case, for example whether a 
complaint was declined because the broadcast did disclose a private fact or because 
the fact was not highly offensive. 
D. Ability to Appeal to the High Court 
A dissatisfied complainant or broadcaster may appeal against a deci sion of the 
Authority to the High Court,80 but must give notice of appeal within one month after 
the date on which the appellant was notified of the decision .81 The determination of 
the High Court on any appeal is final. 82 Approximately two to three appeals are filed 
each year. 83 
The operation of the decision or order appealed against is suspended until the final 
determination of the appeal. 84 In 1997 TV3 appealed against a decision 85 upheld 
against them but failed to prosecute the appeal. After two years the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority applied to have the appeal dismissed. Goddard J accepted that 
78 C v TV3 Network Services Limited (1998-039/040). 
79 Suzi Archer v Pirate FM (1996-026/027). 
80 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 18(1). 
81 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 18(3). 
82 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 19. 
83 Broadcasting Standards Authority Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1999. 
84 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 18(6). 
85 Criminal Bar Association v TV3 Network Serv ices Limited (1997-128). 
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failure to prosecute an appeal under the Act was contrary to the very public interest 
which the Act seeks to protect. 86 As the delay was inordinate and inexcusable on the 
facts the appeal was dismissed. Thus broadcasters must not use their right of appeal to 
diminish the effectiveness of the Authority's orders. 
In the case of privacy complaints the Broadcasting Standards Authority is generally 
the first port of call rather than the broadcaster. Thus the only way to review a privacy 
complaint is by appeal to the High Court. To date there has only been one appeal on 
the grounds of privacy87 and it is difficult to know whether this reflects the quality of 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority's decisions or an insufficient ability to appeal. 
The cost of appealing to the High Court may be a significant barrier to both 
complainants and broadcasters. However there may be a benefit in the appeal process 
being less accessible, because if it were too accessible all complaints would be 
appealed as a matter of course leaving the Broadcasting Standards Authority virtually 
redundant, although the success rate of appeals would also be a factor. The important 
point is that an appeal process is available, so that there is a check on the Authority, 
and where a case demands it it can be utilised. 
E. Effect of the Complainants' Accessibility on Broadcasters 
1. Double Jeopardy 
The tort of privacy was judicially confirmed in the recent High Court case of P v D. 88 
Thus a complainant could both pursue a complaint to the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority and seek damages for breach of the tort of privacy. The danger of having 
two avenues of action available to a complainant is that the Authority may be used as 
a test run for court cases and broadcasters may be subject to a second punishment in 
the courts. 
New Zealand does not have a double jeopardy rule nor are complainants required to 
waive their legal rights when complaining to the Broadcasting Standards Authority,89 
86 TV3 Network Services Limited v Criminal Bar Association of NZ Inc [2000] 1 NZLR 634, 639. 
87 TV3 v BSA, above n 37. 
88 P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 . 
89 The Advertising Standards Authority and the Press Council do require such waivers. 
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therefore the complainant can get a Broadcasting Standards Authority ruling in their 
favour and then take the broadcaster to court as well. Any evidence given in a 
Broadcasting Standards Authority decision is inadmissible in any other court,90 
however it is questionable how effective this is as the decisions of the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority are published. Also delinquent broadcasters often have to 
broadcast summaries of the decisions against them which can have the effect of 
infecting or prejudicing the potential jury pool. 
In the case of TV3 Network Services Limited v Broadcasting Standards Authority91 
Eveready and Home & Safety issued court proceedings against TV3 based on 
allegations of injurious falsehood or disparagement of goods and defamation. Soon 
after, Eveready laid a complaint with the Broadcasting Standards Authority alleging 
breaches of broadcasting standards. McGechan J stayed the broadcasting complaint 
until the proceedings in the High Court had been determined, settled, or permanently 
discontinued.92 Thus if court proceedings are initiated at the same time as the 
complaint they will take priority so the problem lies in court proceedings being 
initiated after a successful complaint to the Authority. 
In St Bede's College v The Radio Network of New Zealand Limited93 the Radio 
Network delayed responding to a complaint because the complainant had threatened 
defamation proceedings. The Authority acknowledged that their cautious approach 
was because of the decision in Eveready however they held that the broadcaster 
should have advised the complainant as to the reason for the delay. 
In Britain the Broadcasting Standards Commission shall not entertain or proceed with 
the consideration of a complaint if it appears to them that the matter complained of is 
the subject of proceedings in a court of law or if the person affected has a remedy in a 
court of law. 94 This clarifies the issue to a certain degree however the second factor 
would bar all privacy complaints in New Zealand now that the tort of invasion of 
90 Broadcasting Act 1989, sl9A. 
91 TV3 Network Sen1ices Limited v Broadcasting Standards Authority [1992] 2 NZLR 724 [Eveready]. 
92 Eveready, above n 91, 738. 
93 St Bede 's College v The Radio Network of New Zealand Limited (1997-110/111). 
94 Broadcasting Act (UK) 1996 s l 14(2)(a) & (b) . 
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privacy has been recognised. 
Although it is possible that the broadcasters may be penalised a second time for the 
same act it is submitted that complainants should not be barred from seeking damages 
through the courts. The Broadcasting Standards Authority provides only minimal 
compensation so a complainant who complains to the Authority for the societal good 
of the maintenance of standards should not be prevented from seeking personal 
redress for the breach of their right to privacy. 
2. Unaffected Complainants 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority is entitled to accept complaints from 
unaffected complainants, individuals other than the person whose privacy has been 
breached.95 In a complaint in 1997 Television New Zealand urged the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority not to accept two complaints from an unaffected couple claiming 
that the complaints interfered with the individuals concerned right to choose for 
themselves whether to complain.96 In their view, Television New Zealand considered 
that a complainant should not be able to make a breach of privacy complaint on behalf 
of someone from whom they had received no mandate to do so and referred to the 
British legislation as a model. 
In Britain a fairness complaint, which includes a breach of privacy, shall not be 
entertained unless it is made by the person affected or by a person authorised to make 
the complaint on his or her behalf.97 If the person affected is unable to make the 
complaint for any reason then a family member or some other person or body closely 
connected to the individual, such as an employer or a body of which the individual is 
a member, may complain on their behalf.98 
By accepting and ruling on privacy claims from unaffected complainants the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority is in danger of breaching the privacy of the 
95 George Gray v Television New Zealand Limited (1996-172); NE & MH Archer (2) v Television New 
Zealand Limited (1997-043/044). 
96 NE & MH Archer (2) v TVNZ, above n 95 . In fact TVNZ also made submissions on this point to the 
Select Committee on Planning and Development on the Broadcasting Bill. 
97 BroadcastingAct(UK) 1996,s 111(1). 
98 Broadcasting Act (UK) 1996, s 111(3). 
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individual concerned. As privacy, once breached, cannot be restored by more speech. 
Even if the individual's name is suppressed the private facts will still be published in 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority's reports. Sam Maling, former chairperson of 
the Broadcasting Standards Authority, has questioned why the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority must accept and rule on complaints about privacy matters from 
people other than those directly affected. 99 
Adopting the British model would be more consistent with the pnvacy of the 
individual, further it would reduce the number of 'busy-body' complaints and prevent 
politicians from using the Broadcasting Standards Authority as part of their 
bandwagon to a certain extent. However the purpose of the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority is to maintain standards and in particular to maintain standards consistent 
with the privacy of the individual. The fact that the Authority has upheld complaints 
from unaffected complainants illustrates that there are instances where a broadcaster 
has not maintained the required standards even though the individual concerned did 
not complain. Thus in order to maintain standards it is appropriate that complaints be 
received from both affected and unaffected complainants in relation to a broadcast. 
3. Unethical Journalism 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority noted in their first privacy case that unlike the 
1976 Broadcasting Act the 1989 legislation did not state "infringement of privacy in, 
or in connection with the obtaining of material included in, programmes broadcast 
... " (emphasis added) and that this may be a restriction on the grounds of privacy. 100 
The Authority still considered this aspect of the complaint and subsequently 
interpreted "consistent with . . . the privacy of the individual" to allow the 
consideration of joumalistically unethical conduct. 101 
Privacy principle (iii) has been used to examine some of the techniques used, 
particularly by television, to obtain material such as the secret recording of a business 
99 Broadcasting Standards Authority Quarterly Report July 2000. 
100 McAllister, above n 23 . 
101 Dr Ranganui Walker v Television New Zealand Limited (1990-006). 
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interview, 102 filming of an interview at an individual's front door by a camera out of 
· bl · I 03 d d , l · I 04 view on pu 1c property, an oor-steppmg comp amts. 
Gathering material for broadcast is an integral part of broadcasting, thus the inclusion 
of unethical conduct in the scope of the principle of invasion of privacy is justifiable. 
However this is an area not specifically covered by the privacy principles. A clear 
statement of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's position on the matter would be 
useful to assist broadcasters in regulating their own conduct. 
4. Frivolous, Vexatious and Trivial Complainants 
The Authority has the power to decline to determine a complaint if it considers that 
the complaint is frivolous, vexatious or tri vial. 105 However a broadcaster does not 
have this power and must therefore give due consideration to every complaint they 
receive. Sam Maling has suggested that there needs to be found a way to sieve out 
some especially trivial complaints before the broadcasters or the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority commit their time and resources to enquiry. 106 
If complainants had to pay to complain, even a token fee, this may prevent some of 
the more trivial complaints. However this may also have the effect of turning away 
genuine complaints. The Authority does have the power to award costs against the 
complainant. This power has not yet been utilised in any privacy complaints, however 
it could be an effective disincentive to trivial, vexatious or frivolous complaints. 
This is unlikely to be an issue in the case of a privacy complaint as these generally 
involve the serious principle of privacy. However it could become a problem in the 
future if the number of complaints continues to rise. 
102 Gene Leckey v Television New Zealand Limited (1993-138). 
103 Mrs S v TV3, above n 71; TV3 v BSA, above n 37. 
104 Dr Paul Smedley v Television New Zealand Limited (1994-029); Michael Laws v TV3 Network 
Services Limited (1997-024). 
105 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 11. 
106 Maling, above n 6, 4. 
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IV. EFFICACY OF THE BSA'S APPROACH TO PRIVACY 
- THE BSA'S JURISPRUDENCE 
A broadcaster's understanding of 'standards consistent with the pnvacy of an 
individual' arises primarily from the Broadcasting Standards Authority's privacy 
principles. However an understanding of the principles can only be gained through a 
thorough reading of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's jurisprudence. This is an 
acute limitation on a broadcaster's access to the standards and is thus a serious 
limitation on a broadcaster's ability to implement the standards. This section analyses 
the decisions of the Broadcasting Standards Authority and attempts to identify what 
'standards consistent with the privacy of the individual' has been interpreted to mean. 
A. Public Disclosure 
Public disclosure is the first requirement as the Authority's jurisdiction is limited to 
complaints about material which has been broadcast. The manner in which material 
has been gathered cannot raise broadcasting issues until it is broadcast. 107 Disclosure 
of p1ivate facts to one person is sufficient to contravene the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority's privacy principles, 108 although in the context of broadcasting establishing 
disclosure is not usually difficult, especially where the item complained of has been 
broadcast on nation-wide television. The degree of publication may be relevant to the 
quantum of damages or compensation. To date this has not been stated as a factor in 
any of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's decisions, however the Authority takes 
into account all the circumstances when making an order. 
Once it is established that the relevant facts were publicly disclosed it is necessary to 
establish that the disclosure identified an individual. 
B. Identification 
The Broadcasting Act provides that broadcasters are responsible for maintaining 
standards which are consistent with the privacy of the individual. Therefore before the 
107 MacKenzie v TVNZ, above n 74. 
108 Ms P v TV3 Network Services Limited (1994-021). 
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privacy principles can be applied to a broadcast it is essential that the broadcast 
discloses the identity of an individual. The individual must be living, as privacy rights 
do not attach to the deceased. 109 The individual does not need to be identified to 
everyone, "identity is revealed if the person would be recognised by friends, 
neighbours and acquaintances." 110 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority considers that in most cases identification to 
only a limited number of individuals, closely connected to the person, is unlikely to 
offend the principles. But if a wider group than this, such as friends and acquaintances 
can identify the individual , then this will raise a potential privacy issue. 111 It is not 
necessary that the individual's name be disclosed if the individual's clothing, voice or 
deportment can establish identity, 11 2 or if details given by the broadcaster identify the 
individual. 
If a broadcast refers to a group of people no breach will exist unless the comments can 
be attributed to an individual in that group. 11 3 For example in a documentary about 
abortion a reference was made to the aborting of foetuses of the daughters of the 
presidents of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child. The Broadcasting 
Standards Authority held that the privacy principles did not apply because the 
statement did not refer to an identifiable individual. 
Electronic masking or pixellation does not entirely protect a person's identity. The 
Broadcasting Standards Authority has warned broadcasters on several occasions of 
the limitations of these techniques, as individuals are often still identifiable by their 
physique and voice. 114 "[T]he blurring of the person's face in itself is usually an 
insufficient claim that a person's identity has not been revealed." 115 Further if the 
surrounding context can identify the individual then pixellation is ineffective. A girl 
was held to be identifiable as although she was pixellated she was filmed with her 
109 The Hope Family v Television New Zealand Limited (1999-237). 
110 RR v TV3 Network Services Limited ( l 999-076/077). 
11 1 J D v TV3 Network Services Limited (l 999-085/086). 
11 2 RR v TV3,aboven 110. 
113 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child & Others v 60 Minutes (1993-108/109/l 10). 
11 4 RR v TV3, above n 110 and J D v TV3, above n 111. 
11 5 RR v TV3, above n 110. 
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father who was not. 116 Broadcasters must also be careful when filming courtrooms as 
a child was identified in Peter Ellis' appeal case, as the name was visible on a file in 
the courtroom. 11 7 
A distinctive car is insufficient to identify its owner if the owner may not have been 
the driver on the occasion referred to. 11 8 However the distinctive first names of two 
girls in a radio broadcast was sufficient to identify their mothers.' 19 
Thus the broadcast must disclose the identity of an individual. It need not be a direct 
identification so long as the person is recognisable by their friends and acquaintances. 
C. Definition of Privacy 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority has primarily defined the standard of privacy 
as protection against the public disclosure of private facts, 120 and some kinds of public 
facts 121 where the facts disclosed are highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 122 The 'public' facts contemplated concern 
events (such as criminal behaviour) which have, in effect, become private again , for 
example through the passage of time. 
The standard of privacy also includes protection against the intentional interference 
(in the nature of prying) with an individual ' s interest in solitude or seclusion .123 The 
intrusion must be offensive to the ordinary person but an individual's interest in 
solitude or seclusion does not provide the basis for a privacy action for an individual 
to complain about being observed or followed or photographed in a public place. 124 
This principle has generally been used for intrusive filming or recording and any other 
sort of prying, such as hidden cameras. Eavesdropping on a private conversation in a 
11 6 G v Television New Zealand Limited (l 999-229/230). 
11 7 Dunphy v TVNZ, above n 66. 
11 8 R v The Radio Network (1999-031 ). 
119 Presland v North/and Radio Company Ltd (1992-069). 
120 Privacy Principle (i) see Appendix I. 
121 Privacy Principle ( ii ) see Appendix I. 
122 Privacy Principles (i) and (ii) see Appendix I. 
123 Privacy Principle (iii) see Appendix I. 
124 Privacy Principle (iii) see Appendix I. 
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public place is an intentional interference with an individual's privacy. 125 Electronic 
eavesdropping on a private business conversation amounted to an offensive 
intrusion, 126 and an obscene telephone call broadcast on a radio programme was also 
held to be an intrusive or objectionable interference with a person's right to 
privacy. 127 
Another interesting point is that a person does not need to be present in order for their 
interest in solitude or seclusion to be interfered with. Footage of a woman's home, 
which had formerly been the home of a senior gang associate with whom the Children 
and Young Persons Service had placed two juvenile offenders, was an invasion of 
privacy even though the woman was not present. 128 
In 1996 the Broadcasting Standards Authority extended pnvacy to include the 
protection against the disclosure by a broadcaster, without consent, of the name and/or 
address and/or telephone number of an identifiable person. 129 This principle does not 
apply to details which are public information, or to news and current affairs reporting, 
and is subject to the 'public interest' defence in principle (vi). 130 
These principles are the basis of the Authority's definition of privacy, however they 
contain many uncertainties. Many terms are introduced but the scope of the meanings 
are not defined such as private and public facts and highly offensive and 
objectionable. These concepts are discussed below. 
D. Private Facts and Public Facts 
1. Public or Private? 
Categorising factual information as either public or private facts is not an entirely 
clear cut procedure. The concept of 'private facts' evades a simple definition. In their 
first privacy complaint 131 the Broadcasting Standards Authority quoted the Australian 
125 Geoff Black v The Radio Network Limited (1999-003). 
126 Leckey v TVNZ, above n 102. 
127 J v 92.2XS (now Radioworks) (1998-023/024). 
128 J & J McDonagh v TVNZ, above n 59. 
129 Privacy Principle (v) see Appendix I. 
130 Privacy Principle (v) see Appendix I. 
131 McAllister, above n 23. 
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Law Reform Commission's report of 1979 which stated that private facts were: 
"matters relating to the health, private behaviour, home life or personal or family 
relationships of the individual." 132 On the other hand public facts are, by exclusive 
definition, facts that are already in the public arena, as these cannot be private facts. 133 
Between these clear examples lies a spectrum of shades of privacy and publicity. This 
is illustrated by Chief Justice Eichelbaum's comment in the High Court: 134 
On any sensible construction the meaning of [private facts] cannot be restricted 
to facts known to the individual alone. Although information has been made 
known to others, a degree of privacy, entitled to protection, may remain. 
Therefore whether a fact is public or private m nature generally depends on how 
available that information is in the public arena. In general, information on public 
record such as criminal convictions 135 and births, deaths and marriages 136 are public 
facts. A person's name, address and telephone number are generally public facts if 
they are listed in a public directory. 137 
However the Broadcasting Standards Authority has held that in some circumstances 
disclosure of a person's name, address and telephone number may invade their 
privacy. In some instances it is because they constitute private facts or because they 
are protected by law 138 and in some cases because they are protected by principle (v). 
Principle (v) attributes a quality of privacy to an individual's name, address and 
telephone number. Arguably these details, where they are listed in public telephone 
directories, are public facts which should not be protected. In fact the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority has held that a person's name, address and telephone number are 
132 Australian Law Reform Commission Unfair Publication: Defamation and Privacy (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1979). 
133 NE & MH Archer (2) v TVNZ, above n 95; S v Th e Radio Network (1998-020). 
134 TV3 v BSA, above n 37, per Eichelbaum CJ. 
135 Monica O 'Neill v TV3 Network Services Limited (1994-093). 
136 Dame Thea Muldoon v TV3 Network Services Limited (1994-112). 
137 Dr Ranganui Walker v TVNZ, above n 101. 
138 The names of rape victims are suppressed by the Criminal Justice Act 1985, section 139. The 
provision only applies to reports or accounts 'relating to any proceeding commenced' in respect of the 
specified offences. 
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not highly offensive or objectionable facts. 139 In which case this principle seems to 
require something more, perhaps that the facts are disclosed in circumstances that 
would be objectionable to the reasonable person. This was the case when this 
principle was applied in Ross Warren v The Radio Network of New Zealand 
Limited, 140 the details were disclosed for the express purpose of encouraging a public 
protest, so the circumstances raised the issue of privacy. 141 
The factual situation that principle (v) was introduced to address had in fact already 
arisen in 1990. The second privacy case the Authority ever had to consider was a 
broadcast by a radio station host of the name, address and telephone number of a 
prominent spokesperson on issues affecting Maori. Dr Ranganui Walker had 
commented that theft was a form of income redistribution. The host encouraged 
listeners to telephone Dr Walker and/or help themselves to his property in the name of 
redistribution. In that case the Authority held that the broadcaster had infringed the 
individual's privacy by encouraging others to engage in activities which could, and in 
fact did, result in an invasion of his privacy. The basis for this argument was that 
section 4 requires broadcasters to maintain standards which are consistent with the 
privacy of the individual. 
It is difficult to see the necessity of this principle as it only serves to ascribe a quality 
of fairness to the disclosure of the facts which is already addressed or should be 
addressed under the highly offensive and objectionable limb. Also principle (v) 
explicitly states that it is does not apply to details which are public information. This 
seems to be a contradiction in terms given that the majority of this information is 
listed in the telephone directories and is therefore public information. 
2. The Public Arena 
The bounds of the public arena are not clearly defined. If a person has already been 
named, or information about an individual is publicly available, then that information 
139 Paul Carabatakis v Pirate FM (1994-025). 
140 Ross Warren v RNZ, above n 67 . 
141 Ross Warren v RNZ, above n 67 . 
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can be regarded as in the public arena and has therefore lost its quality of privacy. 142 
As indicated by Chief Justice Eichelbaum, information that has come into the public 
arena may not have lost its private character, this is determined by the "nature, scale 
and timing of previous publications." 143 In other words if by some misfortune private 
information has come into the hands of the media this does not automatically 
transform it into public information which can be broadcast nation-wide. The 
principle is similar to that already established in the field of breach of confidence 
where information ceases to be confidential only when it is known to a substantial 
number of people. 144 Also the media can only publish that which has become public 
knowledge. If a subsequent publication adds further factual information it will be a 
breach of confidence. 145 
Common-sense is a reasonable guide to the bounds of the public arena, for example 
any discussion with a reporter, other than one which is 'off the record' , can be 
reproduced or summarised by the reporter, as once it is disclosed to the reporter the 
facts are no longer private. 146 Also the location of the incident can provide some 
guidance. Being observed, followed or photographed in a public place is not an 
intrusion into an individual's privacy, so if the individual is in a public place principle 
(iii) does not apply, 147 and generally if the filming occurs from a public place the 
privacy principles will not apply.148 However if the individual is on private property 
and is filmed surreptitiously from public property this will be an intrusion in the 
nature of prying. 149 In one case the Authority stated: 150 
Surreptitious filming from a camera hidden in a public place or the use of a 
telephoto lens while sited in a public place could be considered to amount to 
prying in some circumstances. 
142 Maternity Services Consumer Council v TVNZ, above n 69, NE & MH Archer (2 ) v TVNZ, above n 
95; (1997-043/044), Murray Arnesen v TVNZ, above n 68 ; Steve Alloway v 95BFM (1997-144/145). 
143 TV3 v BSA, above n 37, per Eichelbaum CJ. 
144 See Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1988] 3 All ER 545 , 643 . Also see 
Media Law, above n 41 for a general di scussion on the doctrine of breach of confidence. 
145 Attorney-General of the United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129, 175 per 
Cooke P. 
146 Mrs S v TV3 , above n 71. 
147 Jim Wallace v TV3 Network Services Limited (1999-068/069/070/07 l/072/073). 
148 Graeme Cook v Television New Zealand Limited (1991 -001 ); Dr Paul Smedley v TVNZ, above nl04. 
149 Mrs S v TV3, above n 71 ; TV3 v BSA , above n 37. 
150 Dr Paul Smedley v TVNZ, above n 104. 
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The justification for not allowing privacy actions for conduct that occurs in public is 
that anybody who was there could have seen the conduct and could subsequently 
describe it. However where such methods as telephoto lenses are utilised it is arguable 
that what is filmed is not capable of being viewed in public. Filming with a hidden 
camera is sometimes more akin to fair dealing thus it is appropriate that the additional 
element of surreptitious filming be required. 
3. Public Places 
Principles (ii) and (iii) raise the issue of the distinction between private and public 
places. The Broadcasting Standards Authority has not defined what a 'public place' is, 
instead it has dealt with the concept on a case by case basis. Overall the Authority has 
attributed 'public place' a wide meaning including places open to the public. 151 The 
roof of a car-parking building 152 and a night-club with an admission fee 153 have both 
been held to be public places. If the filming is of a business address rather than a 
residential address there is less likelihood that the Authority will find that there has 
been an intrusion into the person's solitude. 154 Nonetheless a psychologists office 155 
and a doctors office 156 have both been held to be private places. 
An interview room in a police station is a private place insofar as it is generally not 
accessible to the public, except with the permission of the police or in the exercise of 
some other legitimate authority. 157 It is to be distinguished from a public place as 
contemplated by privacy principle (iii). The process of a police interview is essentially 
a private matter at the time, notwithstanding that those matters may become matters of 
public record later. 
151 Michael Stace Privacy - lnte1preting the Broadcasting Standards Authority's Decisions (The 
Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1998) 38. 
152 RR v TV3, above n 110. 
153 H v Television New Zealand Limited (1993-177). 
154 Frank Lane v Television New Zealand Limited (1992-094). 
155 Drury & Daisley v TV3 Network Services Li111ited (1996-130/131/132). 
156 Burnell & Others v Television New Zealand Li111ited (1999-087/088/089). Also in William de Hart 
& Others v TV3 Network Services Limited (2000-108 - 113) the broadcast of hidden camera footage 
filmed in Dr Fahey's surgery was an intentional interference with his interest in solitude and seclusion. 
However the broadcast was held to be in the public interest. 
157 Atihana Johns v Television New Zealand Limited (1999-201/202). 
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4. Passage of Time 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority has further clouded the issue of distinguishing 
between public and private facts by extending the definition of privacy to include the 
disclosure of highly offensive and objectionable public facts that have become private 
through the passage of time. Exactly when a public fact will have the necessary 
quality of privacy due to the lapse to time is unclear. An incident which resulted in a 
conviction for assault was held to have become a private fact as the offence and 
conviction related to relatively minor matters and had occurred more than six years 
previously. 158 An allegation of sexual harassment was a private matter after twelve 
years as it was supposed to have been expunged from the individual's employment 
file after two years. 159 However the privacy of a complainant who was still serving a 
two-year suspended sentence was not protected by the passage of time 160 and an eight 
year old murder conviction was not private. 161 
This principle does not define at what point in time a person's public past becomes a 
matter of that person's private life. It appears there are several factors involved: the 
nature of the public fact or the offence; the length of time that has elapsed; an 
individual's right to put their past behind them; the public's right to know and the 
circumstances of the particular case. Public conduct, particularly conduct for which 
the person is not responsible, does seem to be an area that should be protected. In an 
American case the filming of a road accident victim, who was disfigured and 
distressed, was held to be a breach of privacy. 162 
This principle seems to be usurping the role of Parliament. The determination of when 
a criminal conviction is spent is a matter for Parliament and until such time as 
Parliament passes legislation such as the United Kingdom's Rehabilitation of 
Offenders Act 1974, all convictions in New Zealand stand. Thus it is difficult to say 
how criminal convictions on public record can ever become private again. The case of 
158 MM v TV3 Network Services Limited (1999-103/104). 
159 Drury & Daisley v TV3, above n 155. 
160 J D v TV3, above n 111. 
161 Earlly v Radio Pacific Ltd (1994-043) . 
162 Leverton v Curtis Pub Co 97 F Supp 181 (1951). In Bathurst City Council v Saban (1985) 2 
NSWLR 704 Young J, citing Leverton, thought it might be open for an Australian court to give relief 
where a person was photographed surreptitiously in an embarrassing pose. 
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Tucker v News Media Ownership Limited gives this principle some weight. In that 
case, by acknowledging a right to privacy, McGechan J implied that in some 
circumstances criminal convictions might be private facts. However that case can be 
distinguished on the ground that the right to freedom of speech was in competition 
with the right to life, rather than just the right to privacy and although McGechan J 
reminded himself of the danger of hard cases making bad law perhaps he did not heed 
his own warning. 
In TV3 v Broadcasting Standards Authority163 a woman was interviewed at her back 
door regarding her husband's conviction for the incest of their five daughters. 
Unbeknownst to the woman the interview was filmed from an adjoining landfill and 
broadcast, insufficiently obscured, together with allegations that she had been aware 
of the her husband's actions when they occurred twenty years ago. In upholding the 
complaint Chief Justice Eichelbaum stated: 164 
The authority can properly take the view that privacy in this setting should 
include relief from individuals being harassed with disclosure of past events 
having no sufficient connection with anything of present public interest. 
Principle (ii) purports to allow the protection of public facts in some cases, when in 
actual fact it is defining when public facts can become private facts, since after a lapse 
of time information is no longer regarded as being in the public arena. Lapse of time 
is also an important consideration in the defence of public interest, once a fact is no 
longer current it is less likely to be in the public interest. 
The Jack of certainty regarding the extent of the contents of the public arena creates 
difficulties. The purpose of regulation is to prevent invasions of privacy by providing 
sufficient guidance to broadcasters. Thus the case by case clarification of the bounds 
of the public arena does not promote effective maintenance of the standards of 
broadcasting. 
163 TV3 v BSA, above n 37. 
164 TV3 v BSA, above n 37, 724. 
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E. Highly Offensive and Objectionable to the Reasonable Person of 
Ordinary Sensibilities 
1. Highly Offensive Facts or Disclosure of Facts ? 
Privacy is, by nature, subjective. An individual's conception of privacy is inherently 
personal. It arises from their belief system and from their cultural upbringing. It is 
influenced by economic, locational, temporal and personal factors. 165 To allow for the 
variance in people's tolerances to invasions of privacy, the private facts that are 
disclosed must be highly offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities. The Broadcasting Standards Authority's ostensible focus is that 
the facts themselves must be highly offensive and objectionable, the manner of 
disclosure does not infer this. This reasoning is difficult, as it is generally the fact that 
the facts have been disclosed that is highly offensive rather than the facts themselves 
or the method of disclosure. For example a person's name and address can not be 
described as highly offensive and objectionable facts but the disclosure of these facts 
could be highly offensive and objectionable. The unwanted and unwarranted 
disclosure of private information or the circumstances in which a fact is disclosed can 
easily be described as offensive whilst in general the facts are innocuous and the 
description of offensiveness is forced . 
This paper agrees with Alfred Hill ' s suggestion that the single principle of the 
shocking character of the disclosure should be the decisive factor. 166 Under this 
approach the nature and extent of the publication would be factors in the 
determination. In the end it may just be a question of semantics, as the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority, in applying this standard of offensiveness to the reasonable 
person, has generally taken a holistic approach regarding not only the facts but the 
disclosure and the circumstances of the disclosure. This can be seen in Burnell & 
Others v Television New Zealand Limited where the Authority stated: "the issue is 
whether it was highly offensive or objectionable to film this child in these 
165 Katrine Evans Privacy and Publicity: Restraining Abuses of Power in New Zealand (Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1999) 17 . 
166 P Keeton & W L Prosser, above n 29. 
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. t " l 67 Al b d . h h . h 1 c1rcums ances. so to e note 1s t at t e courts m pnvacy cases ave a so 
adopted the phraseology used by the Broadcasting Standards Authority. 168 
In DD v The Radio Network1 69 a man who entered and won a competition, stated that 
the reason he deserved a holiday was because his wife had left him and their two sons 
for a nineteen year old who had subsequently 'dumped' her. The Authority held that 
that the details disclosed were highly offensive and objectionable because of their 
personal nature. However a better analysis would be that the facts were private 
because of their personal nature and the disclosure was highly offensive and 
objectionable because it was unbalanced and portrayed her in a negative light. In an 
earlier case, Presland v Northland Radio Co Ltd,1 70 a radio announcer, dedicating a 
song entitled "Let's Talk about Sex" to two girls with the same unusual name, said "I 
hope that all you girls do is talk about it, but we know that your mothers don't just 
talk about it." This case demonstrates the difficulty in describing the facts as highly 
offensive and indeed the Authority's own words indicated that they felt the disclosure 
was offensive rather than the fact of the woman's sexual relationship: 171 
.. the Authority decided that the broadcast disclosed private facts of no public 
interest and exposed [the complainant' s] personal life to the public in a way 
which most people would find objectionable. [The complainant] acknowledged 
to the Authority that she was a separated woman, who at the time, had been 
involved in a relationship with a person also known to the announcer who made 
the comment. In her comments to the Authority [the complainant] has expressed 
considerable anguish about the disclosure of the private fact and the Authority 
accepted that disclosure of the relationship was highly offensive to an ordinary 
person. 
The Authority also placed a strong emphasis on the considerable anguish the 
complainant expressed she had suffered. This appears to be less objective than the 
reasonable person standard required. Often the standard of the reasonable person is 
167 Burnell & Others v TVNZ, above n 156. 
168 See: Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd [1993] l NZLR 415; TV3 v BSA , above n 37; P v D, above n 88 . 
169 DD v The Radio Network, above n 58. 
170 Presland v North/and Radio, above n 119. 
171 Presland v North/and Radio, above n 119. 
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glossed over in the Authority's decisions. This raises the concern that it is simply 
being used to disguise pure judgement calls. 
Footage of a child receiving medical treatment after being rescued from a burning 
building was not highly offensive or objectionable because it was fleeting and served 
to illustrate an essential point of the news story; also the manner of the reporting was 
not highly offensive or objectionable. 172 The manner of disclosure was the relevant 
issue here not the fact that the child was receiving medical treatment or had been the 
victim of a house fire. 
Footage of a child in the throes of a severe behavioural episode was held to be highly 
offensive and objectionable. 173 Again the fact of the child's behavioural disorder 
could not be said to be offensive but in the words of the Authority the "publication of 
which was capable of being highly offensive or objectionable to the reasonable 
person." 174 
2. Public Figures 
A possible gloss on the reasonable person standard, that is not clearly elucidated in the 
privacy principles, is that public figures are expected to be more robust, 175 as they 
command less privacy than is afforded to other people. 176 It has been stated that: 177 
People in public life must accept a higher level of media intrusion because of the 
power, influence, privilege and financial rewards they seek, exercise and enjoy. 
As the Broadcasting Standards Authority often uses public interest to find that a fact 
is not highly offensive and objectionable it is unclear whether there is a higher 
standard than that of the reasonable person for public figures or whether the public 
interest in public figures justifies a higher level of interference. For example in the 
172 Paul Le Comte v Television New Zealand Limited (1999-159/160). 
173 Burnell & Others v TVNZ, above n 156. 
174 Burnell & Others v TVNZ, above n 156. 
175 Michael Laws v TV3, above n 104. 
176 Dr Ranganui Walker v TVNZ, above n 101. 
177 Jim Tully "The Public Face of Privacy" in P Ballard (ed) Power and Responsibility: Broadcasters 
Striking a Balance (Broadcasting Standards Authority, Wellington, 1994) 130. 
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case of McAllister v Television New Zealand Limited178 the Authority held that the 
public interest in Glen McAllister's death made it impossible to describe the news 
item as highly offensive or objectionable to the reasonable person. 179 
In either case it is difficult to justify why public figures should command less privacy 
than anybody else. Certainly the public needs to know when a person's private 
conduct bears upon their ability or suitability to perform their duties. The 
Broadcasting Standards Authority has held that surreptitious filming of guests arriving 
at Vogel House, from a site were the broadcaster had permission to be, did not breach 
the privacy of the individuals filmed due to the political nature of the function. 180 The 
Authority has also held that seeking a telephone comment from a public person is a 
legitimate practice. 181 
The Authority accepts that a single telephone call to most people, but especially 
to people who hold positions of authority and whose opinion on relevant matters 
can be expected to be sought, will rarely amount to an invasion of privacy within 
the terms of s4(l)(c). 
However public figures ought to be able to retain a degree of privacy regarding their 
personal life. Just because one puts one's self in the public arena it cannot be said that 
a public interest is created in knowing the whole of the person, not just that which the 
person concerned decides to release to the public. 182 The public interest should only 
justify the broadcast of important or relevant information not the broadcast of 
information solely because it is interesting. 
By entering the public arena public figures do invite a degree of examination of their 
persona] background and some persona] information will as a result become general 
knowledge. Where this is the case that information will lose any quality of privacy. 
178 McAllister, above n 23 . 
179 This is illustrative of the Broadcasting Standards Authority's tendency not to strictly apply their 
principles. A matter should be able to be described as highly offensive before the defence of public 
interest is considered. 
180 Sir Roger Douglas, Richard Prebble, David Lange v Television New Zealand (1991-016/017/018). 
181 Gisbome Boys' High School Board of Trustees v Radio 89FM (1992-007). 
182 John Burrows "Privacy from a Legal Perspective" in P Ballard (ed) Power and Responsibility: 
Broadcasters Striking a Balance (Broadcasting Standards Authority, Wellington, 1994) 85. 
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The reasoning behind this is agam similar to that in breach of confidence cases. 
Primarily it is to avoid absurdity as "[t]he law would indeed be an ass if it prohibited 
access to information in one form even though it was freely available in another." 183 
Further it is argued that publicity negates confidentiality and by analogy publicity 
negates privacy. As a matter of logic it cannot be said that information is private if it 
is publicly known. The third argument is based on harm. Once a private fact has been 
widely publicised further publication cannot add to the harm. This was the case in 
Sam Hunt v Radio New Zealand where it was held that Sam Runt's address was not a 
highly offensive fact because it was a well-known piece of general knowledge in 
Wellington. 184 
Another difficulty is the definition of public figures. Politicians and famous people are 
public figures but the position of those in public roles such as police and ambulance 
officers is less clear. Footage of a police officer shooting a woman involved in an 
armed robbery did not breach the officer's privacy as, although he was identifiable, 
the incident occurred in a public place and the police are accountable for their 
actions. 185 However the naming of two ambulance officers involved in an incident, 
but who were in no way responsible for the death in question, was a breach of their 
pnvacy. 
The case of reluctant debutantes, which was discussed earlier, is also unclear. 
However instead of creating a separate category for reluctant debutantes, the 
surrounding circumstances should be a factor in the consideration of whether the 
disclosure is highly offensive and objectionable. 
3. Fine Factual Distinctions 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority's emphasis on the facts in each case leads to 
fine distinctions which more closely resemble judgment calls than application of the 
reasonable person standard. In the case of George Gray v Television New Zealand 
Limited186 a shot of a senior public servant's home which was rep01tedly empty 
183 Media Law, above n 41, 163. 
184 Sam Hunt v Radio New Zealand (1994-079). 
185 Stephen P lhaka v TV3 Network Services Limited (1997-035). 
186 George Gray v TVNZ, above n 95. 
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because the family was overseas was a breach of privacy. Also in the case of J & J 
McDonagh v Television New Zealand Limited187 footage of an empty house which 
had previously been home to gang associates with whom the Childrens and Young 
Persons Service had placed two juvenile offenders breached the privacy of the current 
owners. However in Eleanor Kietzmann v TV3 Network Services Limited188 recent 
pictures of a house central to an eight year old murder inquiry, as it had been a haunt 
for drug dealers and prostitutes were not inconsistent with the privacy of the current 
owner. In the first two cases the broadcaster admitted error but in the third case which 
went directly to the Broadcasting Standards Authority the Authority did not follow the 
preceding cases, distinguishing on the basis that the photos were obtained from a 
public place. In Gray the location from whence the photos were taken was not at 
issue, rather the fact that Television New Zealand had erred in disclosing information 
which was not relevant to the item was the decisive factor. McDonagh appears to 
have been upheld because the footage was obtained by trespass and thus amounted to 
a trespass whilst the footage of the house in Kietzmann was insufficient to amount to 
prying or intentional interference with solitude. 
F. The Defence of Public Interest 
Principle (vi) establishes public interest as a defence to invasion of privacy and 
defines public interest as matters of legitimate concern or interest to the public. This 
defence, in balancing the right to privacy with the right to publicity, underpins the 
whole privacy-publicity debate. To function adequately in the role of the fourth estate 
the media need to be assured that where they act in the public interest they will be 
protected. The Authority has cited an Australian Law Reform Commission Report 189 
which stated that genuine public interest, not prurient morbid curiosity, was necessary 
to justify the publication of sensitive private facts. 190 The Broadcasting Standards 
Authority considers this principle involves a balancing act as "an individual does not 
have the inalienable right to be left alone- but neither does the media have the right to 
. d bi ,,1 9 1 mtru e unreasona y. 
187 J & J McDonagh v TVNZ, above n 59. 
188 Eleanor Kietzmann v TV3 Network Services Limited (1997-116). 
189 Gisborne Boys High School Board of Trustees v Radio 89FM, above n 181. 
190 Australian Law Reform Commiss ion Privacy - No. 22, above n 32. 
191 Gisborne Boys High School Board of Trustees v Radio 89FM, above n 181. 
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In an appeal of a Broadcasting Standards Authority decision to the High Court, Chief 
Justice Eichelbaum stated: 192 
Once again it is necessary to draw attention to the distinction between matters 
properly within the public interest, in the sense of being of legitimate concern to 
the public, and those which are merely interesting to the public on a human level 
- between what is interesting to the public and what it is in the public interest to 
be made known. 
Therefore just because remarks may be interesting to the public does not mean that it 
is in the public interest that they be reported. 193 It is difficult to exhaustively classify 
what information is in the public interest. Traditionally exposure of crime, 
impropriety, corruption or hypocrisy have been held to be in the public interest. 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority has held that there is public interest in 
broadcasting an incident involving the cover-up of the death of a soldier by f1iendly 
fire, 
194 
in the inquiry into and reporting on a public official's execution of his duties 195 
and in the nazi activities at the funeral of a man who had shot dead another before 
killing himself. 196 In the latter case the Authority stated: 
News of (at least recent) crimes and those who commit them, of government 
policy, and of groups within society whose values contrast sharply with 
traditional norms are, in the Authority's view, matters of genuine public interest 
or concern. Glen McAllister' s funeral and its aftermath were occasions which 
b h h . 197 rought toget er t ese var10us matters. 
Thus to be in the public interest the information must be current and of concern to the 
public at large. In the St Paul's Cathedral case there was held to be no public interest 
in showing a private video depicting Canon Somers-Edgar inebriated at a private 
192 TV3 v BSA, above n 37 , 733 per Eichelbaum CJ. 
193 Geoff Black v The Radio Network Ltd, above n 125. 
194 Jill Banbury & JA Curley v TV3 Network Services Limited (1999-060/061). 
195 Jim Wallace v TV3, above n 147. 
196 McAllister, above n 23 . 
197 McAllister, above n 23. 
party, among people he believed to be friends, because he was not a public figure, he 
held no public office and as an employee of the Diocese he could be expected to have 
a minimal public profile. 198 Broadcasting details of a man, including his name and 
picture, whom police had identified as a child molester was in the interest of public 
safety. 199 
There is public interest in the work of the police and the variety of situations they 
confront in the course of their duties, and as a cautionary tale to would-be 
offenders.
200 
However the public interest did not warrant the intrusive filming of a 
child, as the public interest factor could and should have been addressed in other 
ways.
201 
There is also no public interest in disclosing the paternity of a child on 
national television. 202 
Another factor in the determination of public interest is the amount of time that has 
lapsed since the matter occurred. Allegations that a mother had known her husband 
was abusing their daughters and that she had done nothing about it was held not to be 
a matter of public concern because the events had occurred over twenty years ago.203 
The public interest defence does not extend to elements that are not necessary to the 
illustration of the particular story. 204 For example footage of an intoxicated woman 
falling on her face when her hands were handcuffed behind her was not in the public 
interest because the public interest was outweighed by the offensiveness of the 
205 sequence, and the sequence was not necessary. 
G. The Defence of Consent 
Principle (vii) provides that an individual who consents to the invasion of his or her 
privacy cannot later succeed in a claim for breach of privacy. Also children's 
198 The Dunedin Diocese & Others v TV3 'Sex, Lies & Videotape' above n 72. 
199 NE & MH Archer v TVNZ, above n 95. 
200 J D vTV3, above n 111. 
201 Burnell & Others v TVNZ, above n 156. 
202 Commissioner for Children & Others v Television New Zealand Limited (1999-093 to 101). 
203 Mrs S v TV3, above n 71. 
204 G v TVNZ, above n 116. 
205 Atihana Johns v TVNZ, above n 157. 
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vulnerability must be a prime concern to broadcasters. When consent is given by the 
child, or by a parent or someone in loco parentis, broadcasters shall satisfy themselves 
that the broadcast is in the best interest of the child. 
This principle establishes consent as a defence to the invasion of the privacy of an 
individual. The consent can be express or implied by the circumstances,206 but must 
be given by the individual concerned. 207 The Authority has implied consent where the 
complainants had themselves publicised the issues208 and where the individuals filmed 
did not themselves complain.209 In a 1999 case a couple signed an irrevocable consent 
to footage of their wedding preparations and ceremony appearing on the television 
show Weddings. However the groom complained when the programme aired footage 
later in the series announcing that the couple's marriage had failed after only 2 
months. It was held that by appearing on the show a public interest in their marriage 
existed and therefore did not consider whether the privacy waiver extended to the 
subsequent programme. 210 
In the case of consent to the filming and broadcasting of footage of children "[t]he 
Authority is of the view that such consent can only be given by the parents or legal 
guardians of a child, and then only in circumstances where it is in the child's interests 
to permit filming and subsequent broadcast."211 Further in a subsequent case the 
Authority emphasised that broadcasters must recognise that the best interests of a 
child might not be the same as the best interests of the parents or guardians.212 In 1999 
as a result of these cases and to clarify the broadcasters responsibilities in relation to 
the privacy of children the Broadcasting Standards Authority extended this principle. 
Thus the Broadcasting Standards Authority's approach to privacy is well established. 
A broadcast must identify an individual and disclose highly offensive and 
objectionable facts about that individual or offensively intrude on the solitude or 
206 J R Bowen v Television New Zealand Limited (1993-123). 
207 Atihana Johns v TVNZ, above n 157. 
208 J R Bowen v TVNZ, above n 206; Pam Sutton v The Radio Network of New Zealand Ltd (1997-022) . 
209 J R Bowen v TVNZ, above n 206. 
210 MT v Television New Zealand Limited (1999-123). 
211 Phillip Smits v Television New Zealand Limited (1998-005/006). 
212 Burnell & Others v TVNZ, above n 156. 
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seclusion of the individual. However the essential distinction between public and 
private facts 1s ill defined and the application of the highly offensive and 
objectionable standard to the facts creates unusual and difficult reasoning in the 
decisions. 
The defences of consent and public interest are comparatively straightforward 
although they are not strictly applied as defences, and public interest could benefit 
from further elaboration. Further complicating the Authority's approach to privacy are 
the closely related concepts of fairness and reputation. 
V. BORDERING ON PRIVACY: FAIRNESS AND REPUTATION 
The difficulties in applying the privacy principles highlight that privacy is a difficult 
concept to define. Regarding privacy, John Burrows has cautioned that: 213 
So fluid are its boundaries that one must resist the temptation to bring within it 
complaints of other sorts of unfairness and other sorts of abuses of privilege 
which are not properly intrusions into privacy at all. 
However it is submitted that the Broadcasting Standards Authority has not resisted 
this temptation and has allowed privacy to cross the boundaries of fairness and 
reputation. 
A. The Overlap Between Privacy and Fairness 
Privacy and fairness are concepts which overlap to a certain degree. This has been 
acknowledged by the Broadcasting Standards Authority214 and the Authority has 
observed that there are occasions when complaints of privacy are more appropriately 
dealt with as issues of fairness. 215 Even in the High Court McGechan J described Mr 
Tucker as a reluctant debutante and held that "[t]here is some element of unfairness in 
213 John Burrows "Privacy from a Legal Perspective" in P Ballard (ed) Power and Responsibility: 
Broadcasters Striking a Balance, above n 182, 88. 
214 H v TVNZ, above n 153. 
215 L v Television New Zealand Limited (1999-238). 
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holding that inevitable situation against him."216 The potential disclosure may have 
been unfair, especially given the state of Tucker's health, but it is questionable 
whether the publication of criminal convictions on public record was really an 
invasion of privacy. 
Principle (iv) protects against the disclosure of private facts to abuse, denigrate or 
ridicule personally an identifiable person. This principle is said to be of particular 
relevance should a broadcaster use the airwaves to deal with a private dispute. 
However, the existence of a prior relationship between the broadcaster and the named 
individual is not an essential criterion. This is really an extension of principle (i) to 
include situations where the individual is dealt with unfairly. 
This principle arose from the fact situation in the case of L v Radio Liberty217 which 
involved a radio announcer using the airwaves to deal with a private disagreement. 
The host gave out his ex-girlfriend' s name, address and telephone number and abused, 
denigrated and ridiculed her. The Broadcasting Standards Authority felt that none of 
the privacy principles covered the particular fact situation so added p1inciples (iv) and 
(v). 
Principle (v) ascribes a quality of privacy to names, addresses and telephone numbers . 
As discussed earlier this is also really a matter of fair dealing rather than privacy.218 
These principles are focussed on very particular fact scenaiios which is good from the 
broadcaster's perspective in that it provides more clarity. However there is a danger 
that very specific principles may be inflexible and complaints may not easily fit the 
mould. This is probably not a problem where, as is the case with the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority, there are a couple of general principles which cover most 
situations. 
2 16 Tucker, above n 22. 
2 17 L v Radio liberty (1996-004/005/006). 
218 See discussion in Part IV under Private and Public Facts , 30. 
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B. The Overlap Between Privacy and Reputation 
Principle (iv) has been used to cover situations where a broadcaster has not checked 
the veracity of the contents of its broadcast and as a result the broadcast has been 
. t219 t . d 1· . 220 A b d 1 . h . d"d mcorrec or con ame ma 1c1ous rumours. roa caster cannot c aim t at 1t 1 
not know the facts were untrue or that a caller to the program was responsible for the 
statement as the broadcaster is responsible for the contents of all its programmes, even 
those of a talk-back nature. 221 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority has held that the veracity of the facts is not 
relevant to the issue of privacy. 222 However it is strongly arguable that if a statement 
is false it is not a statement of fact, disclosure of which cannot, therefore, be an 
invasion of privacy. False statements that lower the plaintiff in the eyes of the right-
thinking members of society are a matter of defamation which is outside the 
jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Standards Authority. Although the Authority can 
address false statements under the standards of accuracy and good taste. 
Although privacy, fairness and reputation are closely aligned it is essential that the 
Broadcasting Standards Authority is not seen to be extending its jurisdiction. If it 
appears a complaint for defamation or fairness will be considered by the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority under the guise of privacy complainants may forum shop. 
VI. TOWARDS A CODE OF BROADCASTING PRACTICE FOR 
PRIVACY 
The Broadcasting Amendment Act 2000 has given the Authority the power to develop 
codes of broadcasting practice with respect to privacy. To promote high standards of 
broadcasting it is submitted that a code should be developed which broadcasters can 
can refer to quickly and use in training. The development of a code would be a good 
chance to consolidate the Broadcasting Standards Authority's jurisprudence. It would 
also be an opportunity to regulate some of the more procedural matters that have been 
219 BB v Radio Bay of Plenty , above n 65. 
220 Mr Xv HB Media Group limited (1997-161/162). 
221 Mr Xv HB Media Group, above n 220. 
222 Mr Xv HB Media Group, above n 220. 
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established to date, such as the ability to infringe privacy by conduct in gathering 
material. 
Such a code should be sufficiently detailed that a full understanding of 'standards 
consistent with the privacy of the individual' can be gained without reading a single 
judgment of the Broadcasting Standards Authority. This would ensure new 
broadcasters and hobby broadcasters could easily comply with the appropriate 
standards. It would also give complainants a clearer concept of what privacy is, 
allowing them to more clearly articulate their complaints. The code need not be too 
legalistic, a degree of flexibility can and needs to be maintained, but within a well-
defined structure. 
In the second appendix I have developed a draft code of broadcasting practice for 
privacy. It is not comprehensive but outlines a framework within which greater 
guidance can be given. Ideally the code would build and expand on the Authority's 
privacy principles, defining key concepts and even giving illustrative examples from 
the Authority's decisions. The concept of privacy needs to be more closely defined so 
that the Broadcasting Standards Authority is not seen to be using it to extend their 
jurisdiction. The definition and application of the highly offensive and objectionable 
standard should also be clarified, as should the scope of the public interest defence. 
Also the privacy of public figures and of children should be clearly enunciated. 
The code should also regulate the conduct of broadcasters in gathering and reporting, 
especially covert reporting and sensitive reporting such as the coverage of funerals. 
And complainants should be encouraged to complain directly to the broadcaster where 
it is appropriate. Therefore guidance as to appropriate remedies would be useful, 
especiaJly as to when and how much compensation is appropriate. 
A code would create more certainty for both the broadcasters and complainants. It 
would facilitate both the making of complaints and the resolving of complaints. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Broadcasting Standards Authority began with no guidance from the legislature as 
to what privacy should encompass and has now developed a workable definition and 
accumulated a wealth of knowledge in the area of privacy. The Broadcasting 
Standards Authority achieves a high level of accessibility for complainants. As was 
seen in Part III the Authority is more cost effective, faster and less adversarial than the 
court system. The procedure is less formal and does not require representation. The 
Authority also has a far greater ability to liase with broadcasters. All of which 
encourages complaints. 
However the Authority's privacy principles and their application raise some issues of 
clarity, definition and scope. Although privacy is a difficult concept to define it is 
possible to create a clear and comprehensive framework to regulate the broadcasting 
industry. 
To further promote the maintenance of 'standards consistent with the privacy of the 
individual' it is submitted that the Broadcasting Standards Authority should further 
clarify and develop their privacy principles and ideally work together with 
broadcasters towards a code of broadcasting practice for privacy, giving greater 
guidance and responsibility to the broadcasters. 
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APPENDIX I - THE PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
Principle (i) - Private Facts 
The protection of privacy includes legal protection against the public disclosure of 
private facts where the facts disclosed are highly offensive and objectionable to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
Principle (ii) - Public Facts 
The protection of privacy also protects against the public disclosure of some kinds of 
public facts. The 'public' facts contemplated concern events (such as criminal 
behaviour) which have, in effect, become private again, for example through the 
passage of time. Nevertheless, the public disclosure of public facts will have to be 
highly offensive to the reasonable person. 
Principle (iii) - Intrusion 
There is a separate ground for a complaint, in addition to the complaint for the public 
disclosure of private and public facts, in factual situations involving the intentional 
interference (in the nature of prying) with an individual's interest in solitude or 
seclusion. The intrusion must be offensive to the ordinary person but an individual's 
interest in solitude or seclusion does not provide the basis for a privacy action for an 
indi victual to complain about being observed or followed or photographed in a public 
place. 
Principle (iv) - Abuse, Denigration and Ridicule 
The protection of privacy also protects against the disclosure of private facts to abuse, 
denigrate or ridicule personally an identifiable person. This principle is of particular 
relevance should a broadcaster use the airwaves to deal with a private dispute. 
However, the existence of a p1ior relationship between the broadcaster and the named 
individual is not an essential criterion. 
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Principle (v) - Identifiable Person 
The protection of privacy includes the protection against the disclosure by the 
broadcaster, without consent, of the name and/or address and/or telephone number of 
an identifiable person. This principle does not apply to details which are public 
information, or to news and current affairs reporting, and is subject to the 'public 
interest' defence in principle (vi). 
Principle (vi) - Public Interest 
Discussing the matter in "the public interest", defined as of legitimate concern or 
interest to the public, is a defence to an individual's claim for privacy. 
Principle (vii) - Consent and Children 
An individual who consents to the invasion of his or her privacy, cannot later succeed 
in a claim for breach of privacy. Children's vulnerability must be a prime concern to 
broadcasters. When consent is given by the child, or by a parent or someone in loco 
parentis, broadcasters shall satisfy themselves that the broadcast is in the best interest 
of the child. 
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APPENDIX II - DRAFT CODE 
INTRODUCTION 
Where a broadcast identifies an individual, broadcasters must ensure that the 
programme and its presentation are consistent with the privacy of that individual , 
unless the individual consented to the broadcast or the broadcast was in the public 
interest. 
1 GENERAL 
1.1 An individual's privacy cannot be protected to such an extent as to override the 
legitimate interests of other members of society. 
1.2 An individual's right to p1ivacy must be balanced with the right to freedom of 
expression in section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990. 
1.3 An individual does not include groups, incorporated bodies or the deceased. A 
public figure is an individual, and is entitled to a right of privacy. 
1.2 An individual's privacy does not extend to their conduct in public places. 
1.3 A public place is any place that is accessible to the public irrespective of 
whether there is an admission charge. 
1.4 The Broadcasting Standards Authority's jurisdiction is limited to material in or 
related to an actual broadcast. 
1.5 Unaffected complainants, individuals other than the person whose privacy was 
breached, are entitled to complain. 
1.6 Individuals are encouraged to complain in the first instance to the broadcaster 
concerned. However complainants do have the right to lay privacy complaints 
directly with the Broadcasting Standards Authority. 
1.7 Complaints of fair dealing, balance, accuracy, good taste and decency are not 
covered by this code. Complainants should refer to the radio and television 
codes in regard to these standards. 
1.8 This code is not exhaustive and it may well require elaboration and refinement 
over time. The specific facts of each complaint are especially important when 
privacy is an issue. 
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2 IDENTIFICATION 
2.2 A broadcast identifies an individual where 
1) The individual is named in the broadcast and/or 
2) A picture or sound bite of the individual is broadcast and 
3) The name, picture or sound bite is sufficient to enable friends, neighbours or 
acquaintances of the individual to identify the individual. The voice, 
clothing, characteristics, deportment or the surrounding circumstances may 
identify an individual. Techniques such as pixellation and electronic 
masking are not always sufficient to conceal an individual's identity. 
3 CONSISTENT WITH THE Pruv ACY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
A broadcast is not consistent with the privacy of an individual where it discloses 
private facts or where the broadcast intentionally interferes with an individual's 
interest in solitude or seclusion. The disclosure or the intrusion must be highly 
offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
3.1 The broadcast discloses private facts and that disclosure is highly offensive 
and objectionable to the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
3.1.1 PRIVATE FACTS 
1) Private facts include matters relating to the health, private behaviour, home 
life, family relationships, and personal relationships of the individual. 
2) Private facts are facts known only to the individual or a small number of 
people. 
3) Facts that are easily accessible on public records are not private facts. 
4) Some public facts can become private over time. Broadcasters must 
exercise care with information that is no longer current and respect the 
ability of individual's to put their pasts behind them. 
3 .1.2 HIGHLY OFFENSIVE AND OBJECTIONABLE 
Whether the disclosure is highly offensive and objectionable to the reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities will depend on: 
1) The relevance and necessity of the disclosure. 
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2) The manner of the disclosure. 
3) The circumstances sun-ounding the disclosure. 
3.1.3 REASONABLE PERSON OF ORDINARY SENSIBILITIES 
The reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is an objective standard. 
Broadcasters are not required to uphold standards consistent with the most 
sensitive members of society. 
3.2 The broadcast intentionally interferes (in the nature of prying) with an 
individual's interest in solitude or seclusion. The intrusion must be highly 
offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person of ordinary 
sensibilities. 
3.2.1 INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN SOLITUDE 
OR SECLUSION 
This concept encompasses conduct such as: 
1) Surreptitious recording: 
• use of hidden or planted sound recorders or cameras, 
• cameras with telephoto lenses , 
• eavesdropping. 
2) Sensitive reporting such as funeral coverage 
3) Unethical conduct in obtaining material for broadcast. (Note that the 
Authority can only examine such conduct where it relates to a specific 
broadcast). 
3.2.3 HIGHLY OFFENSIVE AND OBJECTIONABLE 
Whether the intrusion is highly offensive and objectionable to the reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities will depend on: 
1) The relevance and necessity of the intrusion. 
2) The manner of the intrusion. 
3) The circumstances surrounding the intrusion. 
3 .2.4 REASONABLE PERSON OF ORDINARY SENSIBILITIES 
See 3.1.3 above. 
54 
4 DEFENCES TO A BREACH OF THE STANDARDS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
PRIVACY OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
If a broadcast is consented to or the broadcast is in the public interest then it 
is a justified breach of the standards. 
4.1 CONSENT 
4.1.1 An individual who consents to the invasion of his or her privacy, cannot later 
succeed in a claim for breach of privacy. 
4.1.2 Consent must be obtained from the individual concerned unless the individual 
lacks the capacity to consent for themselves. 
4.1.3 When consent is given by a child, or consent is obtained from a parent or 
someone in loco parentis on behalf of a child, broadcasters shall satisfy 
themselves that the broadcast is in the best interest of the child. 
4.2 PUBLIC INTEREST 
4.2.1 Discussing the matter in the public interest is a defence to an individual's 
claim for privacy. 
4.2.2 However the means of obtaining the information must be proportionate to the 
matter under investigation. 
4.2.3 A matter is in the public interest if it is of legitimate concern or interest to the 
public. This includes the exposure of crime or disreputable behaviour, 
protecting public health or safety, exposing misleading claims made by 
individuals or organisations, disclosing significant incompetence in public 
office. 
5 REMEDIES 
5.1 Where a broadcaster has infringed the privacy of an individual the broadcaster, 
where appropriate, should: 
1) Apologise to the individual concerned in writing; 
2) Take appropriate steps to prevent further breaches and/or to prevent similar 
breaches occurring in the future; 
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5.2 Where the infringement of privacy has caused harm or distress to the 
complainant the broadcaster or the Authority may award compensation, not 
exceeding $5,000, to the individual concerned. In determining the amount of 
compensation the following factors should be taken into account: 
1) The extent of the infringement and any consequences of the infringement; 
2) Other action taken by the broadcaster; 
3) The personal harm caused by the infringement. 
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